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ABSTRACT
Population aging is just beginning to hit the industrialized countries in full force, and it will have
a tremendous impact on capital markets. In this paper, we argue that the capital market effects of
population aging are particularly strong in continental European economies such as Germany, France, and
Italy, with their large and ailing pay-as-you-go public pension systems, relatively thin capital markets, and
poor capital performance. The younger generations in these countries are quite aware of the need to
provide for more retirement income through own private saving, and these effects will be accentuated by
fundamental pension reforms that aim at more pre-funding. Population aging changes households’
savings behavior and portfolio composition, and much more assets will be invested on the stock market.
Capital markets will grow in size, and active institutional investors such as pension funds will become
more important in continental European countries. These changes are  likely to have beneficial side
effects in terms of improved capital efficiency, total factor productivity, and growth. Looking at the
effects of population aging on savings behavior and capital markets therefore adds a new dimension to
the continuing debate about advantages and disadvantages of pay-as-you-go and fully funded pension
systems.
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1. Introduction 
France, Germany and Italy, to take the three largest economies in continental Europe, have large 
pay-as-you-go public pension systems that face severe problems due to population aging (see 
OECD, 1988, and World Bank, 1994). As computed by the International Monetary Fund (Chand 
and Jaeger, 1996), the size of the public pension systems as a percentage of GDP will increase by 
about 50 percent from 1995 to 2030 in France and in Italy, and almost double in Germany, if 
benefits stay as they were in 1992 in real terms (see table 1-1).  If the additional expenditures are 
financed solely by contributions, these will rise approximately in proportion.  Expressed as a per-
centage of the wage bill, French workers would then pay 38 percent to their pension system in the 
year 2030 rather than 24 percent in 1995.  In Germany, the contribution rate would rise to 41 per-
cent, and in Italy even to 62 percent of the wage bill.  If the additional burden was financed solely 
by debt, it would exceed 100 percent of GDP in France, 115 percent in Germany, and as much as 
180 percent in Italy by the year 2035.  Similar numbers have been published by the OECD 
(Rosevaere et al., 1996).  
At the same time, France, Germany and Italy have thin capital markets in the sense that only few 
households own and control productive capital (either directly or via investment and pension 
funds). French, German and Italian savers hold a considerable smaller share of stocks than Anglo-
Saxon households. As a result, stock market capitalization is low in these three countries, and 
pension funds play only a minor role in household saving (see table 1-2).  
Finally, France, Germany and Italy have, in comparison to the United States, poor capital per-
formance as measured by capital productivity and various rates of return.  While international 
comparisons of these statistics are difficult and controversial, the existing evidence yields a clear 
picture, as summarized in table 1-3. Firms in France and Germany have substantially lower capi-
tal productivity and return on investment than U.S. companies achieve. Relative to the United 
States, financial underperformance is also correlated with lower levels total factor productivity. 
Many authors claim that an important cause for this underperformance is weak corporate govern-
ance (see, e.g., Wenger and Kaserer, 1998; Börsch-Supan, 1998b; Mueller and Yurtoglu, 2000).  
The linkages among these three observations are a fascinating subject for economic policy. This 
is the topic of this paper. It explores the triangle of (i) population aging and pension reform, (ii)   3
life-cycle saving and portfolio decisions, and (iii) capital markets, productivity, and economic 
growth, depicted in figure 1-1. We argue that population aging and pension reform, via a change 
in the savings behavior and portfolio composition of households, and via strengthening capital 
allocation and corporate governance through active institutional investors such as pension funds, 
can have important beneficial side effects on productivity and growth. 
Our line of argument is as follows. Population aging (or, more generally, demographic change) is 
a fact in virtually all countries, with substantial differences in timing. Population aging will 
change households’ saving behavior – even if current pension systems were to be maintained – 
because their internal rate of return will decrease, making own savings as a vehicle for retirement 
income both more necessary and attractive. Moreover, in many countries, such as France, Italy, 
and Germany, population aging makes fundamental reform of public pension systems a top prior-
ity, strengthening own savings for retirement. We show that this results in rising aggregate sav-
ings and capital stocks over the first decades of this century, while thereafter, when the demo-
graphic change is over, the higher old-age dependency ratio will lead to lower savings rates. Our 
quantitative predictions show that the amount of additional capital generated until about 2035 is 
substantial. Finally, increased household saving and changes in households’ portfolio structure 
will also change the nature of capital markets, in particular in those countries that implement fun-
damental pension reforms. Even if no additional savings were created, a higher share of savings 
will flow through traded shares and bonds. There is ample evidence that the size of capital mar-
kets and productivity growth are related. There is also reason to believe that larger capital markets 
and actively managed investment and pension funds enhance corporate governance.  
More concretely, few households in continental European countries such as France, Germany and 
Italy hold financial assets with at least some minimal ownership rights. Those assets are highly 
concentrated among only few households, in stark contrast to countries in which a substantial 
share of retirement income is financed through pension funds.1 A lack of relatively actively man-
aged pension funds results in diffuse (e.g., pyramidal) corporate control structures and weak cor-
porate governance, and thus lowers capital productivity relative to other countries. Pension re-
                                                 
1  We use the word pension fund in the literal sense and strictly distinguish it from unfunded (pay-as-you-go financed) pension 
systems – for example, the U.S. Social Security trust fund is not a pension fund in this sense.   4
form towards a higher degree of pre-funding can therefore broaden and deepen capital markets, 
improve capital allocation, strengthen corporate governance, increase capital productivity at con-
stant or even increasing levels of labor productivity, and therefore increase total factor productiv-
ity. 
Research on these complex issues has not yet come far. Evidence on firm performance in funda-
mentally different institutional settings is scarce, and establishing causality to explain observed 
differences is particularly difficult. The aim of this paper are to provide a coherent framework for 
this line of research, to use a formal model to quantify potential effects, to gather the empirical 
evidence that is already available, and to highlight potential implications for public policy. To this 
end, we focus on France, Germany and Italy because these three largest countries in continental 
Europe have a particularly severe aging problem and at the same time very monolithic public pay-
as-you-go systems in need of reform. Examples from Germany appear a bit more frequent – be-
sides knowing this country better than others, we think that Germany is of particular interest also 
to an international audience: Germany is a leading example for an institutional setting with both a 
paternalistic, overly generous but unsustainable public pension system, and a bank-based corpo-
rate governance system with concentrated ownership and poor shareholder protection. 
The remainder of the paper is structured like the triangle in figure 1-1. In Section 2, we discuss 
how population aging and pension reform affect capital markets from a macroeconomic perspec-
tive, and we compute the size of the capital stock generated by households’ optimal response to 
population aging and a realistic transition to a partially funded system, using Germany as an ex-
ample.  The potential magnitude of capital stock changes is an important factor since it shows that 
pension reform has a large leverage for changes in capital market structure and macroeconomic 
performance. Section 3 delivers a picture of households’ life-cycle saving decisions in France, 
Germany and Italy, in particular portfolio choice, and links it to the pension systems in those 
countries. We then discuss how saving patterns are going to change as a reaction to the decreasing 
generosity of public pension systems.  In Section 4, we discuss the role of capital markets for pro-
ductivity and economic growth. We consider the overall size and liquidity of capital markets, and 
more specifically, the potential role of activist pension and investment funds in corporate 
governance.  Section 5 summarizes and concludes.   5
2. Why and how demographic change affects capital markets 
This section has two purposes. First, we show that Europe’s public pay-as-you-go pension 
systems face severe problems which can hardly be solved without a introducing a substantial de-
gree of pre-funding. Hence, capital markets and their governance mechanisms will play an in-
creasingly important role in the future. Second, we show how large this role is likely to be under 
realistic assumptions. Specifically, we use an macroeconomic simulation model to predict the 
capital market effects of population aging, and of introducing a funded component to pension 
systems.  
2.1 Demographic change and pay-as-you-go pension systems 
As is well known, population aging is particularly severe in continental Europe, particu-
larly in Italy and Germany. According to EcoFin (2000), Germany’s old-age dependency ratio 
(i.e., the ratio of the number of persons aged 65 and older and the number of persons between 
ages 20 and 64) will more than double from 26.0% in 2000 to 54.7% in 2040. Even worse in Italy 
where the old-age dependency ratio will increase from 28.8% to 63.9% during this period. By this 
measure, Italy will have the oldest population in Europe. France will experience a milder aging 
process with dependency ratios that are below the European OECD average, but still substantially 
above those in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Most European countries have contribution-based pay-as-you-go pension systems (which 
are also the dominant financing mechanisms of old-age social security around the globe), with the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom being notable exceptions. Typical examples 
for the continental European pension system are France, Germany and Italy whose public pension 
systems are monolithical, cover almost all workers and provide most of their retirement incomes 
through a single system.2  Until recently, the French, German and Italian pension systems have 
been very successful in providing a high and reliable level of retirement income. However, times 
have changed. All three countries have experienced a flurry of pension reforms in recent years, 
                                                 
2  For a detailed description of the pension systems in France see Blanchet (1999), in Germany see Börsch-Supan and Schnabel 
(1999), and in Italy see Brugiavini (1999). A critical evaluation of the micro- and macroeconomic features of the German public 
pension system can be found in Börsch-Supan (2000).   6
but they have not succeeded in stabilizing contribution rates, public support, and system enroll-
ment. There are two main reasons for the increasing difficulties of these public pension systems: 
population aging and negative incentive effects on labor supply. In particular, demographic prob-
lems have been exacerbated by a strong decrease in labor force participation due to early retire-
ment and unemployment, and by a shift to jobs that escape social security taxation. The declining 
labor force participation in these countries can at least partially be attributed to the negative in-
centive effects of their public pension systems (Gruber and Wise, 1999; Schnabel, 1999a). 
Because of continuing population aging, contribution rates to public pensions must in-
crease dramatically from their already high levels in the first half of this century if current re-
placement rates were to be maintained. Population aging is therefore a serious threat to the stabil-
ity of the European pay-as-you-go public pension systems. The share of social security contribu-
tions in total labor compensation already exceeds 50 percent in France, Germany and Italy. Be-
cause they are largely viewed as taxes rather than insurance premia (Boeri, Börsch-Supan, and 
Tabellini, 2001), they increase the wedge between workers’ net income and total labor costs to 
the employers, reducing labor supply and creating an obstacle to competitiveness vis-à-vis coun-
tries in Eastern Europe, the United Kingdom and the United States that have lower total labor 
compensation (see, e.g., OECD, 2000). Hence, increasing those contribution rates to the extent 
described appears unrealistic, particularly so because health costs will also rise, and probably 
even faster than public pension costs (OECD, 1988). We do not review the arguments that para-
metric pension reform cannot resolve this dilemma, and that a fundamental pension reform is 
needed. The consensus view in the scientific debate appears to be that a funded component needs 
to be introduced in order to complement the existing pay-as-you-go systems, although the as-
sessments vary in details; see, among others, Miles and Timmermann (1999), Boldrin et al. 
(1999), Börsch-Supan (2000), and Disney (2000). 
Because even patched-up pay-as-you-go systems will have extremely low rates of return, 
more fundamental pension reforms entailing a significant extent of pre-funding have become not 
only economically but also politically more attractive (Boeri, Börsch-Supan, and Tabellini, 2001). 
In most countries, the political debate has moved towards augmenting existing pension systems 
with a funded pillar. Germany and Italy have now started to implement mixed multi-pillar sys-  7
tems. Following the arguments in the previous subsection, France will have little choice but to 
adopt a significant extent of pre-funding as well.  
Börsch-Supan (2000) and Börsch-Supan, Heiss, and Winter (2000) show that such a re-
form can be implemented without too high a transition burden, using a macroeconomic simula-
tion model. In the next subsection, we present a multi-country overlapping generations model at 
allows for quantitative projections for the additional savings that are generated by population ag-
ing and pension reform when capital is internationally mobile. These quantitative models are im-
portant elements of our chain of arguments: pension reform is likely to occur, it can be done, and 
together with the direct effects of population aging, it has quantitatively important effects on the 
capital market. 
To this end, we need to work through the implications of a realistic transition to a partially 
funded multi-pillar pension system. There are several reasons why it is unrealistic to model a full 
transition to pre-funding. First, public pension systems traditionally also have redistributive char-
acter, and redistribution is, through one mechanism or the other, always pay-as-you-go. Estimates 
of the share of pensions that are pure transfers range between 20 to 40 percent in Germany 
(mainly topped-up pensions by a minimum retirement income mechanism and pension points 
earned while in education or while raising children), leaving 60-80 percent of pensions available 
for potential privatization in a multi-pillar system. The shares are similar in France and Italy. 
There are also other reasons to be conservative in the degree of pre-funding. For instance, pay-as-
you-go systems have a built-in insurance against inflation and secular capital market failures. For 
an extensive discussion of these risk aspects, we refer to Miles and Timmermann (1999). 
The fundamental pension reform we consider here implements a transition towards a 
funded system in which the division of labor between pay-as-you-go and funded pillar is implic-
itly given by the policy objective to stabilize the contribution rate of the pay-as-you-go system, 
but to provide with all pillars today’s pension replacement level (e.g., Börsch-Supan, 2000). Un-
der this scheme, the current contribution rate is frozen, implying a decreasing replacement rate of 
the pay-as-you-go system. The resulting pension gap will then be filled through pre-funding. 
2.2 Quantitative predictions of the capital markets effects of aging and pension reform   8
From a macroeconomic point of view, population aging changes the balance between 
capital and labor, in particular in industrialized countries. Labor supply is going to be relatively 
scarce whereas capital  is going to be relatively abundant. This will drive up wages relative to the 
rate of return on capital, reducing households’ incentive to save (if the interest elasticity of saving 
is positive). In addition, some fraction of the capital stock may become obsolete due to the shrink-
ing labor force and diminishing returns to scale, making the accumulation of capital even less 
attractive. Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (2000) present empirical evidence for the nega-
tive long-run effect of increasing old-age dependency ratios on saving. 
In the short term, that is, while dramatic changes in the age structure are underway, the 
behavior of the savings rate is quite different – our simulations show that savings rates increase 
until about 2020, and the capital held by households in aging countries will be (much) higher than 
currently well into the second half of this century. In addition to these domestic effects, there are 
differences in timing of population aging across countries – not only between industrialized coun-
tries and developing countries, but also within the group of industrialized countries as well. Capi-
tal exports from fast-aging countries to those countries with a more favorable age structure can 
reduce aging problems in industrialized countries, but cannot solve them entirely (Blommestein, 
1998; Reisen, 2000). There is also some empirical evidence that the mechanism of age-induced 
capital flows is already at work (e.g., Higgins, 1998).  
In order to quantify the macroeconomic effects of population aging and pension reform, 
Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2001) have developed a dynamic simulation model which is 
a version of the overlapping generations model as introduced by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). 
Overlapping generations models have been used extensively to study the effects of population 
aging on social security systems, a purpose for which they are well suited since they are based on 
households’ and firms’ optimal reactions to movements in the demographic structure and public 
policy measures.3 While the model by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2001) is a very styl-
ized representation of the real world in many respects, they take great care to capture the first-
order effects of demographic change on capital markets. Two features of their model are therefore 
                                                 
3 Recent examples include De Nardi et al. (2000) and Kotlikoff et al. (2000) for the United States, Miles (1999) for Great Britain 
and Fehr (2000) and Börsch-Supan, Heiss and Winter (2000) for Germany. Miles and Iben (2000) present a comparative analysis 
of pension reform schemes for the United Kingdom and Germany based on an overlapping generations model.   9
of particular interest. First, the model consists of several countries with potentially different aging 
processes, and it allows capital mobility. Thus, international capital flows induced by differential 
aging can be explained endogenously. Second, demographic projections used in this 75-
generation model are very detailed. For Germany, these projections are taken from Birg and 
Börsch-Supan (1999), and for the other world regions from the United Nations’ World Develop-
ment Prospects (1998 revision).  
The following projections focus on Germany with its generous pension system, a severe 
aging problem and persistent calls for a fundamental pension reform that implies a shift to more 
pre-funding. To separate the direct effect of population aging and the additional effect of pension 
reform, we present all projections for two scenarios, the current pay-as-you-go system and under a 
fundamental pension reform. These scenarios are polar cases, and they are both counterfactual: 
As we have discussed in the previous section, the current system is politically unsustainable and 
cannot survive at its current level of generosity, while the pension reform that was passed in Feb-
ruary 2001 is by no means as fundamental as the one we consider in our simulations. Even the 
pension reform we analyze in our simulations does not imply a full shift to a funded system, but 
only a partial transition with about one third of retirement income coming from the funded pillar. 
In any case, the eventual outcome of pension reforms might well be somewhere between our sce-
narios. Analyzing these polar cases is, however, helpful since they show that a good portion of  
the capital market effects of population aging would arise even without a fundamental pension 
reform. In addition to the two reform scenarios, we also consider three alternative capital mobility 
scenarios: investment only within Germany (the closed-economy case), investment in the EU 
countries, and investment in the OECD countries.4 
The projects depicted in figure 2-1 show that (i) aggregate savings rates rise substantially 
even under the current pay-as-you-go system, and (ii) aggregate savings rates under a fundamen-
tal pension reform would be higher than under the present system. For example, in the year 2035, 
when the peak of the aging problem occurs, savings rates are projected to be very low under the 
current PAYG system. Conditional on the capital mobility scenario, the aggregate household sav-
ings rate declines from currently around 12 percent (1998) to between 8 and 9 percent, an effect   10
that is due to aging. In contrast, under a fundamental pension reform, the aggregate saving rate 
settles at around 9.3 percent under the assumption of perfect capital mobility within the EU. 
These projections show that optimal life-cycle behavior generates additional saving under a fun-
damental pension reform – it is not the case that additional retirement saving crowds out other 
saving totally, as often claimed. Our projections indicate a substitution of about one third, leaving 
two thirds to new saving.5 It is important to note that all variations of the aggregate saving rate 
shown in figure 2-1 are in the range of the historical variation in German household saving rates. 
Also, we should point out that a recent empirical cross-country study by Samwick (2000) demon-
strates that the direct effect of fundamental pension reforms on savings rates is negative. It is 
therefore important to stress that the increase in the saving rate predicted by our model for the 
next few decades is primarily due to population aging (much more dramatic than in other coun-
tries’ historic experience), and that the pension reform we consider exacerbates the transitory 
positive effect of population aging on aggregate savings rates. 
Next, we aggregate savings to obtain a country’s foreign position and capital stock. Figure 
2-2 shows projections of the total capital stock under the current pension system. A first observa-
tion is that the variations in the time path of the aggregate capital stock are by far less pronounced 
in an open economy. These waves are caused by the alternating dominance of demographic ef-
fects and of growth in labour productivity. The economy gradually accumulates capital until the 
peak of the aging process is reached in 2030, since in the beginning the tendency to disinvest in 
capital due to the aging process is dominated by the modest increase in labour force participation 
and technological progress. After 2030, when the aging process has almost reached its peak, the 
capital stock decreases if Germany is a closed economy. In the open economy case, the growth of 
the capital stock almost disappears, but the growth rate never becomes negative. In the open 
economy scenarios, the German capital stock increases to about 144 (140) percent of its current 
value if the capital is freely mobile within the OECD (EU) relative to 138 percent if Germany is a 
closed economy. Under a fundamental pension reform, the decrease in the German capital stock 
in the closed economy scenario, that is caused by aging, is less pronounced since more capital is 
                                                                                                                                                              
4 In all projections reported here, we assume that all other countries maintain their current pension systems. Börsch-Supan, 
Ludwig and Winter (2001) also consider a scenario in which other countries implement fundamental pensions reforms as well.  
5 The right panel of Figure 3-1 shows discrete adjustment in behavior that occur when the pension reform takes place, or is an-
nounced.   11
accumulated as a result of the pension reform. The increase of the aggregate capital stock is now 
higher than in both the open economy scenarios. This indicates that, under the pension reform, 
relatively more capital is invested abroad.  
Finally, we consider the general equilibrium effects on the return to capital. As can be 
seen from figure 2-3, the return to capital in the closed economy scenario decreases by 0.5 per-
centage points between the years 2012 and 2026, an effect caused by aging. This decrease is only 
around 0.3 percentage points when capital is freely mobile within the European Union, and only 
0.1 percentage points in the OECD scenario. The pension reform leads to a reduction in the rate 
of return to capital caused by the higher supply of capital. In the closed economy scenario the rate 
of return is reduced by 0.5 percentage points in 2050 relative to the rate of return in the current 
pension system. This is much less than often claimed in the public debate. Moreover, the decrease 
in the rate of return to capital reduces to only 0.12 percentage points if capital is freely mobile 
within the EU. In the OECD scenario, the yield difference almost disappears; it is as high as 0.04 
percentage points. This suggests that the additional savings induced by a pension reform should 
be invested internationally, not only for reasons of risk diversification, which we cannot show in 
our deterministic model, but also for sake of higher returns that are possible in the open economy. 
It is also important to note that substantial positive effects of capital mobility occur even in a very 
modest capital mobility scenario. Indeed, Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2001) show that 
there is virtually no difference between the OECD scenario and a scenario where we allow for 
perfect capital mobility in the entire world.  
The transition costs of such a reform are relatively modest; we return to this issue in the 
concluding section of this paper. The main result for the next step of analysis is that the amount 
of additional saving generated by population aging and pension reform is substantial. Whether or 
not this new retirement saving crowds out other savings or not – this is the subject of the follow-
ing section –, the share of pension funds in total productive capital would become substantial, and 
it is likely that this will change the nature of the underlying capital markets. This link between 
pension reform and capital markets will be subject of Section 4. 
3. A closer look at life-cycle saving and portfolio decisions   12
The simulation model we used in the previous sections was based on a very stylized view 
of households’ life-cycle savings behavior, but it allows to get the aggregate effects right. In this 
section, we take a closer look at households’ portfolio choice patterns. We show that they are 
strongly influenced by public pension systems, and we make a prediction of how they are likely to 
change when public pension systems become less generous due to population aging. 
Specifically, we claim that the saving patterns in France, Germany and Italy reveal that 
saving for retirement plays only a small role in these countries relative to other savings motives. 
Turning this argument around, we anticipate a distinct change in savings patterns in France, Ger-
many and Italy in wake of a fundamental pension reform because it revives the retirement savings 
motive. In particular, a partial transition to a funded pension system is likely to change how sav-
ing is related to age and how households select their portfolios. This is, of course, the time-
honored question (Feldstein, 1974; Barro, 1974) whether pay-as-you-go pension systems crowd 
out private saving. We give it a new tack by looking at the life cycle pattern of savings in France, 
Germany and Italy. 
As a point of departure, it is important to realize that the pay-as-you-go financed public 
pensions in France, Germany and Italy have very high replacement rates. They generate net re-
tirement incomes that are approximately 70 percent of pre-retirement net earnings in Germany 
and France, and may even exceed 100 percent in Italy.6 In addition, the public pension systems in 
France, Germany and Italy provide generous survivor benefits that constitute a substantial propor-
tion of total unfunded pension wealth, and disability benefits at similar and often even higher re-
placement levels than old-age pensions. As a result, public pensions are by far the largest pillar of 
retirement income in these countries and constitute more than 80 percent of the income of house-
holds headed by persons aged 65 and older, while funded retirement income, such as asset income 
from private saving or firm pensions in which the employer saves on behalf of the worker, plays a 
much smaller role than, e.g., in the Netherlands or the Anglo-Saxon countries. It is not straight-
forward, however, to infer from these differences between the pension systems the level of saving 
                                                 
6  This replacement rate is defined as the current pension of a retiree with a 45-year average earnings history divided by the cur-
rent average earnings of all dependently employed workers.  This concept is different from the replacement rate relative to the 
most recent earnings because these are usually higher than the life-time average. Because the Italian system uses only the last 5 
years as a pension base and applies a statutory replacement rate of 80% to that base, the replacement rate with respect to the aver-
age lifetime income often exceeds 100%.   13
rates in the different countries – too many other factors, from real estate prices through the or-
ganization of financial markets, are likely to confound such a comparison. We therefore first look 
at life-cycle saving patterns, then at portfolio composition. 
3.1 Life-cycle saving patterns  
Constructing life-cycle savings profiles is not trivial unless one has long time-series of in-
dividual households – such data, however, is not available. Moreover, comparing saving observa-
tions in different countries is tricky as variable definitions tend to vary greatly across countries. 
Fall (2001), Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held, Rodepeter, Schnabel and Winter (2001), and Brugiavini 
and Padula (2001) have analyzed life-cycle saving patterns in France, Germany and Italy within a 
comparable framework. They use repeated cross-section data to separate age from cohort effects, 
and employ comparable variable definitions and data sources as part of the International Savings 
Comparions Project (Börsch-Supan, 2001). Their central finding is that the observed age-
consumption profiles in France, Germany and Italy are rather flat and show no dissaving in old 
age. This is evident from Figure 3-1 which shows, by age group, median saving rates in these 
three countries. 
The samples employed in this exercise do not include elderly living in institutions, so 
there might be a bias towards households which are less likely to dissave. Börsch-Supan (1992) 
shows for Germany that this bias cannot explain the observed pattern at the prevailing rates of 
institutionalization. His selectivity correction only reduces the upturn of saving rates at the oldest 
age categories. The saving profiles in figure 3-1 are also robust to several other specification and 
measurement alternatives; the reader is refereed to Börsch-Supan (2001). 
There are several elements explaining these saving patterns, all linked to the pension sys-
tem. First and foremost, the high replacement rates of the public pension systems in these coun-
tries make additional private retirement income largely unnecessary as pointed out above. Thus, 
saving for retirement, the only motive under the pure life-cycle hypothesis, cannot be the main 
savings motive. In fact, Schnabel (1999b) shows that in Germany retirement is not a time of 
scarce resources for current generations of pensioners. Rather, due to rising productivity and dou-
ble indexation of pensions to gross wages, retirement income has been above average income   14
during working life for cohorts born before 1930.7 Similar arguments hold for France and Italy, 
where pensions provide even higher replacement rates than in Germany (Boeri, Börsch-Supan, 
and Tabellini, 2001). If other saving motives, such as precaution and intergenerational transfers, 
are more important than retirement saving, age-saving profiles are likely to be much flatter than 
under the famous textbook life-cycle hypotheses which predicts saving in young and dissaving in 
old age. This explanation also nicely fits into the work by Jappelli and Modigliani (1998) who 
argue that the main mechanism for retirement savings – the only savings motive under the text-
book life-cycle-hypothesis – is the pay-as-you-go system. If one, as they do, adds contributions to 
these pension systems to savings and subtracts benefits from them, the familiar textbook hump-
shaped saving profiles return indeed. 
Another and related element explaining why the elderly do not appear to dissave is 
brought forward by Börsch-Supan and Stahl (1991), Börsch-Supan (1992), and Schnabel (1999b). 
They find that after retirement, consumption remains low and there are high inter vivos transfers 
as well as positive savings. Börsch-Supan and Stahl (1991) argue that due to deteriorating health 
conditions, the elderly are simply less able to spend as much as they would need to make saving 
negative. A complementary explanation is simply habit persistence in old age. Again, root cause 
is the high annuitized pension income which cannot be borrowed against even if the decline in 
health were anticipated. 
While it may be suggestive and plausible that the rather flat saving profiles in France, 
Germany and Italy are due to the dominant public pension systems in these countries, the argu-
ment is vulnerable because we lack a counterfactual. The most appropriate counterfactual would 
be French, German and Italian data from times when these countries had no pay-as-you-go sys-
tems. Of course, we do not have such data. Another alternative are international comparisons 
across countries with differing mixtures of pay-as-you-go and funded pension systems. Poterba 
(1994) provides a comparison of six OECD countries. It suggests that the textbook hump-shaped 
life-cycle savings pattern is most pronounced in the U.S. and Canada where the replacement rates 
of the public pay-as-you-go pension systems are lower than in continental Europe. These findings, 
however, may be confounded by cohort effects. More significant is therefore the comparison with 
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the cohort-corrected saving rates in the Netherlands 1993, computed by Alessie and Kapteyn 
(2001) as part of the International Savings Comparison Project mentioned above. The Nether-
lands have, as opposed to France, Germany and Italy, only a small base pension provided by their 
pay-as-you-go public pension system, with benefits linked to the minimum wage. All additional 
retirement income in the Netherlands has to be provided by (mandatory) savings plans, commonly 
provided through occupational pension plans. Figure 3-1 shows that the median Dutch household 
has a much more pronounced hump-shaped life-cycle savings profile than the median French, 
German and Italian households. Moreover, figure 3-1 shows dissaving among the elderly as they 
draw down their mandatory saving accounts. Of course, we are aware that this is a comparison 
between four data points only. We are in the process of collecting similar profiles also for the UK 
and the US. 
If indeed most of the saving patterns currently observed in France, Germany and Italy are 
caused by their pay-as-you-go pension systems with their generous retirement benefits, we should 
expect distinct changes in saving patterns in the future. As described at the end of Section 2, a 
pension reform towards a multi-pillar system with a substantial portion of funded retirement in-
come will revive the retirement motive for saving. In fact, these systems will look very similar to 
the current Dutch system. Hence, it is likely that saving rates among the young will increase (to 
accumulate retirement savings), and saving rates among the elderly will decline sharply (because 
they will dissolve their retirement savings). 
The simulation results in Section 2 also give us an order of magnitude for those effects. 
To the extent that all the induced retirement saving by a multi-pillar pension reform is new sav-
ing, the net saving rate of the average German household in mid age would increase by about 4 
percentage points (from 11 to 15 percent). The saving rate would decrease by in old age, when 
retirement accounts are used for consumption, by about 6 percentage points, from 4 to –2 per-
cent). Portfolio composition would also change, see the next subsection. 
Note that some substitution between these new saving for old age and other savings is 
likely. This will decrease the effect of a fundamental pension reform on the overall household 
saving rate, but will increase the effect on portfolio composition. We do not know the precise 
magnitude of such effects. Precautionary saving may even increase, while saving for intergenera-
tional transfers is more likely to decrease in response to introducing a higher degree of self-  16
provided retirement income. The overlapping generations model of section 2, calibrated to Ger-
man data and combined with a bookkeeping model of the new multipillar pension system, yields 
a rough estimate of substitution. It amounts to about one third, i.e., one third of the new saving 
will be crowded out while two thirds will be net additions to the capital stock. 
3.2 Portfolio composition 
The German pay-as-you-go public pension system appears also to have shaped the compo-
sition of household financial wealth. Table 1-4 displays portfolio choice in Germany, as analyzed 
using household data from the 1993 wave of the German Income and Expenditure Survey, drawn 
from Börsch-Supan and Eymann (2001) as part of a parallel internationally comparative exercise 
lead by Guiso, Jappelli and Haliassos (2001). The important role of whole life insurance can be 
seen from the fact that, in 1993, its share in total financial wealth was about a third. The central 
reason for the important role of whole life insurance in German households life-cycle savings 
decisions is its favorable tax treatment (see Brunsbach and Lang, 1998, and Walliser and Winter, 
1999). At the household level, financial saving in whole life insurance is more important than 
saving in stocks and bonds.8 A substantial portion of this saving is used as a device to finance 
homeownership. Pension funds do not even appear in the aggregate statistics, so small is their 
share, very different from The Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Guiso, Jappelli and Halias-
sos, 2001). 
The important role of whole life insurance is also significant for financial markets, as life-
insurance companies are not allowed to invest significantly in stocks, which in turn has been one 
of the main reasons for thin capital markets in Germany (see Deutsche Bank Research, 1996). As 
we discuss in Section 4, these restrictions will become less important because of increased avail-
ability of alternative products and the resulting increase in competition for retirement saving. 
This portfolio composition is likely to change under a partial transition to a multi-pillar 
system. We again use the simulation results for Germany. If there were no substitution between 
new retirement saving and current saving, the net household saving rate would increase by about 
4 percent, as mentioned in the previous subsection. If all of this would be channeled into pension 
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funds, pension funds would amount to between 15 and 18 percent of households’ portfolios, 
comparable to the United Kingdom, the U.S., the Netherlands and Switzerland. Substitution be-
tween new retirement saving and current saving would increase this share, although part of new 
retirement saving may also be made through whole life insurance given its preferential tax treat-
ment. Households’ direct and indirect exposure to stock markets then depends on future invest-
ment decisions of life insurance companies who only recently began to increase their portfolio 
share of stocks. Judging from the international experience in countries as diverse as the United 
Kingdom, the U.S., the Netherlands and Switzerland, a more prominent role of equities on the 
supply side of the capital markets seems very likely when more of the retirement income will be 
pre-funded in France, Germany and Italy.  
We finish this section with one important hint for policy makers: if they want to under-
stand future saving volumes and their allocation and design their policies accordingly, we re-
searchers need better data. If they want forecasts that are more precise than the qualitative trends 
derived from our simulation model, we need longitudinal data on portfolio choice and saving be-
havior. 
4. How strong capital markets enhance productivity and growth 
In the previous sections, we have shown that in aging countries with predominant pay-as-
you-go pension systems such as Germany, population aging, together with an increase in pre-
funding of pension schemes, (i) raises aggregate saving and the balance of assets held by private 
households, and (ii) changes the portfolio composition of private households, with an increase in 
the share of risky assets that offer higher expected returns. We now investigate how these changes  
may affect productivity and economic growth via their impact on financial markets.  
Our argument proceeds in three steps. First, we briefly review the literature on the rela-
tionship between financial market conditions and economic growth, and we present some new 
suggestive evidence for the impact of stock market capitalization and the size of pension funds. 
Next, we investigate one channel through which capital market conditions might have affected 
economic growth over the last two decades or so. Specifically, we show that the poor productivity 
performance of firms in countries such as Germany, France and Italy relative to the United States,   18
the current leader in productivity growth among the large industrialized countries, is related to 
poor corporate governance. Finally, we discuss the potential benefits of an increasing role of ac-
tive investment and pension funds in countries with weak corporate governance structures.  
4.1 Financial market conditions and growth 
We are not the first to argue that the development of financial markets is an important fac-
tor in explaining the sources of productivity and economic growth; see Levine (1997) for an ex-
tensive review of this literature. Following Levine (p. 691), one can distinguish five functions of 
the financial system: (i) to facilitate the exchange of goods and services; (ii) to facilitate the trad-
ing, hedging, diversifying, and pooling of risk; (iii) to mobilize savings; (iv) to allocate resources; 
(v) to monitor managers and exert corporate control. The last two of these functions are of par-
ticular relevance for the present paper.  
In our analysis of the potential effects of population aging and pension reform on eco-
nomic growth, we focus on the role of overall market liquidity and the size stock markets. While 
theoretical models show that banks can generally perform the basic functions of the financial sys-
tems in similar ways as stock markets, recent experience raises doubts that bank-based systems 
have performed as well as market-based systems, at least over the last two decades (see section 
4.2 below).9 Among the many theoretical models that analyze the role of stock markets for re-
source allocation and corporate governance, we mention only a few (Levine, 1997, lists many 
more). Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) show that as markets be-
come larger and more liquid, market participants have more incentives to acquire information 
about firms. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen and Murphy (1990) show that linking man-
ager compensation to stock performance helps to align the interests of managers with those of 
owners, and that takeovers are easier in well-developed stock markets, thus improving corporate 
governance.  
The empirical literature that explores these mechanisms has grown dramatically over the 
last few years. In addition to the survey by Levine (1997), see Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) 
for a helpful review of very recent work in this area. Again, we mention only a few results that are 
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of particular relevance to our argument. In a careful time-series study with aggregate data, Neus-
ser and Kugler (1998) demonstrate that financial sector development predicts GDP growth and, in 
particular, total factor productivity. Levine and Zervos (1998) report that stock market liquidity is 
positively and robustly correlated with contemporaneous and future rates of economic growth, 
consistent with the view that a greater ability to trade ownership of an economy’s productive 
technologies facilitates efficient resource allocation, physical capital formation, and faster 
economic growth. Levine and Zervos also find no negative impact of stock market liquidity, in-
ternational capital market integration, or stock return volatility on private savings.  Similar find-
ings have been obtained by Rajan and Zingales (1998) who compare industrial sectors across 
countries, arguing that financial development reduces the costs of external finance to firms. 
Wrugler (2000) confirms that financial markets play an important role in the capital allocation 
process. He reports that the efficiency of capital allocation is positively correlated with the degree 
of legal protection of investors (i.e., in Anglo-American, market-based financial systems). In par-
ticular, Wrugler argues that market-based systems are more successful in limiting overinvestment 
in declining industries. Finally, using cross-country panel data, Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) 
and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) show that financial intermediaries exert a large, positive 
impact on total factor productivity and GDP growth.  
One frequently made objection against a causal interpretation of the relation between fi-
nancial markets development and economic growth is that financial development is only a lead-
ing indicator of growth, i.e., that expected of economic growth causes improvements in the finan-
cial sector. Such doubts have been addressed with disaggregate studies at the firm and industry 
levels, including some of the more recent work we mentioned above. It is our reading of the lit-
erature that the well-documented positive effect of financial market development on economic 
growth is not due to reversed causality.  
To illustrate the relevance of stock market development and pension funds for economic 
growth and productivity, we present additional empirical evidence based on a panel of 24 OECD 
countries.10 Data on GDP growth rates and stock market capitalization for the period 1998-97 are 
                                                 
10  These 24 countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United States.   20
from the OECD’s World Development Reports (various issues); with a few missing items, the 
number of observations is 211. In addition, we have data on pension funds for 1996 from Bank of 
International Settlements (1998, table V.5) and for 1999 from Merrill Lynch (2001, table 10).  
In table 4-1, we report a Granger causality analysis for the relationship between stock mar-
ket capitalization and economic growth. These regressions confirm that after controlling for fixed 
effects, there is a significantly positive relation between contemporaneous values of stock market 
capitalization and the annual growth of GDP. The relation between lagged stock market capitali-
zation and current GDP growth is also positive and significant, while future stock market capitali-
zation does not significantly predict GDP growth.  
To highlight the relevance of this result for our argument, it is instructive to look at some 
countries in more detail. Figure 4-1 displays for ten countries the combination of stock market 
capitalization (relative to GDP) in 1997 and the average annual growth rate over the 1990-98 pe-
riod. It is striking how four countries with predominant pay-as-you-go pensions systems (Italy, 
Germany, France, and Spain) cluster at low levels of stock market capitalization and relatively 
low GDP growth, compared with the cluster of three countries (the Netherlands, the UK and the 
US) with funded pension systems, high levels of stock market capitalization, and relatively higher 
growth rates. Even though the difference in growth rates might not appear to be large on first 
sight, the compound effect of, say, a 0.5 percentage point growth rate difference over ten years is 
economically quite significant. Needless to say, we do not claim that this figure alone proves cau-
sality, and we haste to add that the positions of the remaining countries in this figure (Japan, Ire-
land, and Sweden) indicate that there are many other factors than stock market capitalization that 
affect economic growth.  
A similar picture arises if we look at the relation of pension fund assets (relative to GDP) 
and the average annual rate of GDP growth over the 1990-98 period; see figure 4-2.11 This is not 
surprising, since the relationship between pension fund assets and stock market capitalization is 
itself relatively tight (with a correlation of 0.603 in the 1996 cross-section). Finally, we consider 
at the relationship stock market capitalization and total factor productivity. Total factor productiv-
ity growth is one of the major sources of GDP growth (Hall and Jones, 1999). We should expect 
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that countries with deeper capital markets have relatively higher levels of total factor productivity. 
Figure 4-3 shows, for the same set of ten countries, the relationship between stock market capi-
talization and total factor productivity, the latter computed from data reported in Hall and Jones 
(1999). Here, the relationship is not very tight, but there is a positive cross-sectional correlation of 
0.387.  
We interpret the evidence presented in this section, together with the wealth of results re-
ported in the literature, as an indication that there is indeed a relation between the depth of finan-
cial markets (i.e., stock market capitalization and size of pension funds) and aggregate economic 
performance. There are, of course, numerous concerns related to small sample sizes and causality, 
and we refrain from giving these results a causal interpretation. Rather, we present additional 
firm-level and cross-country evidence in the next section that suggests that there is indeed a chain 
of causality between capital markets, corporate governance, and long-term economic perform-
ance.  
4.2 Potential reasons for long-term performance differences 
In order to analyze the sources of long-run differences in productivity across countries, 
Börsch-Supan (1998b) combines two sources of variation, across countries and across companies, 
using data from company benchmarking studies by McKinsey Global Institute (1996) for West 
Germany, Japan and the United States. He estimates rates of return on investment and investi-
gates the contribution of capital – more precisely, capital management and capital utilization – to 
total factor productivity. Notwithstanding substantial variation across companies and industries, 
the market sectors of West Germany and Japan had significantly lower rates of capital utilization 
in the early 1990s and created less productive capacity per unit of physical assets than the United 
States did. Börsch-Supan shows that these low rates of capital utilization were only partially due 
to high labor costs relative to capital, leading to high capital intensity at short work hours.  More 
important for the aggregate result of poor capital productivity were the many cases in which man-
agement did not focus on how productively they were using their assets. Conversely, a focus on 
financial performance, especially prevalent among U.S. firms, did create a clear performance ob-
jective that was generally aligned with productivity.   22
In order to address Porter’s (1992) criticism of short-termism, Börsch-Supan (1998b) 
looked at the long-run rates of return.  Over the 1974 to 1993 period, U.S. financial performance 
was significantly better than in Germany, and on average better than in Japan.  He calculated fi-
nancial performance by relating the pay-outs from the corporate sector (interest, dividends and 
capital gains) to the inflows into the corporate sector (debt and equity) through the corresponding 
internal rate of return, including the initial and final stock of financial wealth.12  Results are dis-
played in figure 4-4. For the 20 years between 1974 and 1993, the annualized aggregate rate of 
return was 9.1 percent in the United States compared to 7.4 percent in Germany.  After 1990, 
U.S. rates of return also exceeded Japanese returns.  These estimates are robust with respect to 
changes in definition and computation period for the U.S.-German comparison, while the high 
income share to capital in the early 1970s and the Japanese bubble at the end of the 1980s make 
the U.S.-Japan comparison subject to higher variance.13 These differences in the long-run rates of 
return do not support the view by Porter (1992) that short-termism in the United States compro-
mises long-run financial performance. 
These long-run results by Börsch-Supan (1998b) on cross-country differences of rates of 
return confirm earlier short-run estimates by DeJong (1995), and they have been confirmed by 
Mueller and Yurtoglu (2000). These differences in rates of return are also reflected in the persis-
tence of total factor productivity differences between Germany and Japan versus the United States 
(about 15 percent lower in Germany, 40 percent in Japan for the 1991--1996 period).  While the 
returns to invested capital are, trivially, linked to capital productivity, the link to total factor pro-
ductivity needs more attention because in theory, differences in labor productivity might offset 
opposite differences in capital productivity.  However, this is not the case in practice – just the 
opposite: Labor and capital productivity are positively correlated across countries and industries 
(McKinsey Global Institute, 1996), generating the positive correlation between the returns visible 
in figure 4-4 and total factor productivity. 
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Needless to say, there are many other reasons for international differences in financial per-
formance and productivity in addition to corporate governance. A prime candidate is the extent of 
competition in product markets. However, there may be important interactions with corporate 
governance. Börsch-Supan (1998b) and McKinsey Global Institute (1996) argue that lower pro-
ductivity can be traced to a self-reinforcing interaction of weaker product market competition and 
weaker capital market pressures in West Germany and Japan, which in turn are exacerbated by 
government regulation and ownership. Januszewski, Köke and Winter (1999) investigate whether 
such interactions exist in Germany. Using a panel with data on almost 1000 German firms over 
the 1986–94 period, they find that those industries which are characterized by more intensive 
product market competition tend to see higher productivity growth rates, controlling for the ef-
fects of corporate governance. Similar findings have been obtained by Nickell et al. (1997) for the 
U.K.   
In summary, a corporate governance system with a highly concentrated ownership of capi-
tal by banks and cross-holdings (as in Germany, other continental European countries and in Ja-
pan) appears to generate lower short- and long-run returns to invested capital as well as lower 
total factor productivity than the Anglo-Saxon system with its dominance of institutional inves-
tors. This raises the issue of the role of corporate governance structures in Germany.  
The ultimate owners of capital are households (and the state). However, industrial cross-
holdings and bank ownership weaken this link. This effect is particularly pronounced in Ger-
many: German households (and, on behalf of households, institutional investors other than banks) 
hold a very small share of productive capital.  In 1996, the corresponding share was 11.4 percent 
in Germany while it was 59.8 percent in the United Kingdom and 43.4 percent in the U.S., re-
spectively.  In turn, cross-holdings of German banks and non-financial companies among large 
firms are very common in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon countries.  46.8 percent of all shares 
(measured as gross capitalization) are held by banks and non-financial companies while this share 
is only 1.5 percent in the United Kingdom and 2.5 percent in the U.S., mainly due to legal restric-
tions and tax treatment. Wenger and Kaserer (1998) estimate cross-holdings to be at least 27 per-
cent of gross capitalization in 1994 and presumably much more. Adams (1999) provides a de-
tailed analysis of how current legal arrangements allow managers to hide the structure of cross-
holdings from the public. Adams concludes that “it is impossible to discover the ownership and   24
control structure in Germany from the mandatory accounting publications” (Adams 1999, p. 80). 
Becht and Boehmer (1999) report that 85 percent of all publicly traded firms have a dominant 
shareholder who controls more than 25 percent of the voting rights, in most cases a bank or a 
non-financial company. The concentrated control structure is pronounced by the German proxy 
voting system which gives the banking system convenient access to the votes of dispersed owners 
in the general shareholder meetings.  
While it is undisputed that equity ownership and control rights are highly concentrated in 
Germany, there is less agreement on the impact of the concentrated ownership of shares by banks 
and non-financial companies on firm performance. Wenger and Kaserer (1998) provide evidence 
that the degree of bank involvement is negatively correlated with firm performance, using a sam-
ple of large German companies covering 56 percent of market capitalization. This study has 
credibility because it a common methodological problem encountered in the empirical debate: 
Many effects are poorly identified in historical data due to the absence of any clear cut natural 
experiment, and hence most studies lack a counterfactual. Germany has never experimented with 
large institutional investors, and its corporate governance system has been quite stable over the 
last decades. Wenger and Kaserer come fairly close to using proper exogenous variation in corpo-
rate governance because they use a difference-in-difference approach to link changes in returns to 
changes in the supervisory board for companies with high and low bank involvement. Edwards 
and Nibler (2000) provide a slightly more favorable assessment of German banks’ role in corpo-
rate governance. They report some evidence that concentrated ownership has positive effects on 
firm performance. To the extent that they find positive effects of concentrated ownership, they are 
not particularly related to the role of banks.  In some cases, concentrated ownership has even 
negative effects. 
As we argued before, because of population aging and fundamental pension reforms, and 
because of households’ optimal reaction, countries such as Germany are likely to move from pre-
dominantly bank-based financial systems towards a more prominent role of investment and pen-
sion funds. The evidence reviewed in this section suggest that this should have a positive impact, 
but it was primarily based on the observation that a bank-based system does not provide good 
corporate governance in many cases. The next section discusses why investment and pension 
funds might actually improve corporate governance.   25
4.3 Active pension funds, corporate governance and firm performance 
Pension funds, and investment funds more generally, play almost no role in corporate gov-
ernance in most continental European countries. As reported by the Bank for International 
Settlements (1998), in 1996 pension fund assets represented only 3 percent of total GDP in Ger-
many and 4 percent in Italy, while in the U.S. and the U.K., the shares are 57 percent and 77 per-
cent, respectively (see table 1-2). Götzfried (1998) presents a more detailed analysis of the role of 
pension funds in major European countries. His results are based on a survey conducted by Euro-
stat in 1997. As might be expected, the number of independent pension funds is high in those 
countries that rely heavily on funded pension schemes, i.e., the Netherlands and Switzerland 
(there are no comparable data for the U.K.). In contrast, the number of independent pension funds 
in Germany is extremely small. At the same time, Germany has the largest number of firm-
specific pension plans among those European countries covered, but in terms of their investment 
behavior, these are very different from pension funds in the narrow sense.  
There are several reasons for these differences in the economic role of pension funds.  
Again, we take Germany as an example, although similar arguments can be made for other conti-
nental European countries as well. First, and most importantly, the majority of pension income is 
provided by the public pay-as-you-go pension system, as has been described in Section 3. Thus, 
few households invest in pension funds in the first place. Second, mainly due to tax advantages, 
individual retirement saving is channeled into whole life insurance. Life insurance companies are 
legally barred from investing more than a small part of their portfolios in stocks – up to about 30 
percent of assets for traditional whole life insurance according to life insurance regulations, but 
much less in practice.14 Finally, assets that are accumulated for funded firm pension schemes are 
currently not invested in the capital market, but are set aside as capital reserves in firms’ balance 
sheets, again because of legal and tax reasons. Even to the extent that these funds are invested in 
other firms, they are likely to contribute to the network of cross-holdings. As a result of these 
institutional arrangements, Germany has few institutional investors and stock market capitaliza-
tion is low by international standards (see table 1-2 above).  
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Given the small role that pensions have historically had in countries with pay-as-you-go 
pension systems, we cannot provide empirical evidence based on past experience. Rather, we 
discuss how pension funds influence corporate governance in those countries in which they al-
ready play a major role. To understand pension fund investment and performance, it is useful to 
first think about pension funds in a world with complete markets and no agency problems. Cog-
gin et al. (1993) note that if one accepts the efficient market hypothesis, “all active investment 
management activity is futile” (p. 1040), and the optimal choice for a pension plan would be to 
invest in a passively managed market index fund. Few people, however, would believe that finan-
cial markets are efficient – and managed pension funds do exist. But do actively managed pension 
funds really perform better than a passively managed index fund? In their empirical analysis of 
U.S. pension funds, Coggin et al. (1993) find that after adjusting returns for risk, some fund man-
agers outperform the market while most do not, a result that has been replicated in many similar 
studies.  
An important way for pension fund managers to improve the performance of their funds is 
to take an active role in improving corporate governance. This brings us to the second issue: The 
role of large shareholders in disciplining management and the effectiveness of shareholder activ-
ism are central to understanding the macroeconomic consequences of an increase in pre-funded 
pensions. The basic theoretical argument has been made, for example, by Pound (1988): Institu-
tional investors such as pension funds that have no business relations with a firm can do a better 
job in disciplining management.  
There is a large number of studies which try to evaluate the effectiveness pension fund ac-
tivism. Black (1998) surveys the literature on large shareholder and pension fund activism and 
concludes that pension fund interventions are generally ineffective. However, there are also quite 
a few studies which indicate that pension fund activism has beneficial effects and that agency 
problems are not a major concern in practice. For example, Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) 
study shareholder proposals of the largest, most active funds from 1987 through 1993. They con-
clude that pension funds are successful at monitoring and promoting change in target firms, and 
they do not find evidence to support that funds have other motivations than value maximization. 
This result can be interpreted as indicating that agency problems might not be a major concern in 
practice.    27
Several empirical studies concentrate on the best-known example of an active pension 
fund, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), the largest public pension 
fund in the U.S. and third largest in the world with total assets over 164 billion US Dollar in 
1999. Over the last decade, CalPERS has been at the forefront of shareholder activism, with an 
explicit goal “to efficiently and effectively manage investments to achieve the highest possible 
return at an acceptable level of risk.” To this end, CalPERS reviews the performance of the U.S. 
companies in its stock portfolio on a regular basis and identifies those that are among the lowest 
long-term relative performers. This review process results in a list of companies that are publicly 
identified as a “CalPERS focus company”. In 1999, this list covered nine companies. Among 
other interventions, CalPERS filed 65 shareholder’s proposals in order to improve firm perform-
ance of its focus companies during the 1987-1998 period. The average annual rate of return was 
13.2% over these ten years.15 Nesbitt (1994) reports weak evidence that CalPERS interventions 
affected stock prices of targeted firms positively. Smith (1996) analyzes 51 firms out of the 78 
targeting events of CalPERS over the 1987-93 period. He finds that shareholder wealth increases 
for firms that adopt or settle, and decreases for firms that resist changes proposed by CalPERS. 
Smith concludes that “shareholder activism is largely successful in changing governance struc-
ture, and, when successful, results in a statistically significant increase in shareholder value” (p. 
251).  
Based on these theoretical and empirical findings about the link between active pension 
funds and firm performance, we expect that an increase in the volume of equity controlled by 
pension funds would have major effects on corporate governance in continental European coun-
tries, and thus provide positive effects on aggregate productivity. We end this section with a note 
of warning: While we have seen that pension funds have helped to improve corporate governance 
and productivity in many instances, there are also cases in which investment funds did not per-
form so well. A prominent example is the case of the provident funds in Southeast-Asia which 
have destroyed wealth, as detailed by Asher (1998). While they contributed to economic growth 
through a massive accumulation of capital, they did not increase total factor productivity; see also 
Kim and Lau (1994) and Young (1994). These two faces of the Asian miracle were of dramatic 
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detailed information on CalPERS’ investment strategy and its position on corporate governance and shareholder activism.   28
relevance in the recent Asian crisis, and they bear several lessons for funded pension systems. In 
particular, the Asian experience shows the importance of competition among funds, as realized in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries and in Chile, and to a lesser extent in the Netherlands and Switzer-
land.  
5. Summary and policy conclusions 
Population aging will change saving behavior, and pension reform – an ongoing process in the 
core European countries – will amplify these changes. Population aging will induce an increase in 
savings between 2015 and 2025. Saving rates will decline thereafter. Pension reform adds to the 
increase and dampens the decrease even though about one third of saving for retirement will dis-
place other saving. A higher share of saving will flow through stock and bond markets, thereby 
changing the nature of the capital markets in countries where stock market capitalization is low 
and industrial bond are rare – notably in France, Germany and Italy. Finally, there is ample evi-
dence that the size of capital markets and productivity growth are related. There is also reason to 
believe that larger capital markets and actively managed investment and pension funds enhance 
corporate governance. 
What does this mean for economic policy? First and foremost, population aging is more 
than adjusting pensions and the health care system. Population aging actually profoundly changes 
the macroeconomic balance in Europe. While this is not an entirely new insight for economists, it 
tends to get lost in the policy debate which over and again focuses on social policy issues in a 
narrow sense. 
Indeed, and this is our second policy conclusion, the debate about public pension reform 
should be broadened accordingly. Our main argument is that fundamental pension reform – a 
transition from the dominant pay-as-you-go systems in continental Europe to a substantially 
higher extent of pre-funding – has benefits over and above those that are usually in the focus of 
the transition debate. Here, we have stressed benefits arising through more efficient capital mar-
kets (another channel for positive effects of pension reform on economic efficiency and growth is 
the reduction of labor market distortions). Such efficiency gains are potentially large enough to   29
overcompensate the welfare losses created by the transition burden induced by a fundamental 
pension reform. They therefore significantly change the political economy of pension reform. 
Our argument adds a new and important dimension to the debate of advantages and disad-
vantages of pay-as-you-go and fully funded pension systems. While we know that in steady state, 
funded pension systems are advantageous relative to pay-as-you-go pension systems whenever 
the interest rate exceeds the growth rate of the wage bill, we also know that this of little help in 
the case of an economy which already has a pay-as-you-go pension system, as stressed by Sinn 
(2000).  Such an economy has to pay back its implicit debt which had financed pension payments 
to the first generation of beneficiaries, before being able to enjoy the advantages of a funded sys-
tem.  Paying back this implicit debt implies a consumption loss – the so-called transition burden.  
In a simple Solow economy with a fixed technology, the consumption loss due to the transition 
burden is exactly equal to the consumption gain that will be achieved through the higher capital 
stock in a funded pension system (Aaron, 1966).  The result also holds under more general condi-
tions, e.g., when pension benefits must be financed by distorting payroll taxes that are in propor-
tion to pension benefits (Brunner, 1996; Fenge, 1997). 
This equivalence result, however, rests on a crucial condition, namely fixed household be-
havior (i.e., saving rates and portfolio choice) and a fixed technology (i.e., factor productivities). 
We argue in this paper that these assumptions are counterfactual. We will experience changing 
saving rates and portfolio choices, and we will see major shifts in the allocation of capital, induc-
ing changes in efficiency in those countries that have thin capital markets, such as France, Ger-
many and Italy. This opens the possibility that a (partial) transition from a pay-as-you-go to a 
funded pension system, through its positive effects on capital markets, results in efficiency and 
welfare gains in spite of the transition burden. 
How important is this quantitatively? Aren’t these irrelevant second order effects? We be-
lieve not. In order to assess the magnitude of the potential feedback effects that must be induced 
by improvements in capital allocation in order to compensate for the transition burden, consider 
again our example of a fundamental pension reform in Germany that would imply a partial transi-
tion towards a one-third funded pension system. Using our simulation OLG model of section 2 
again, we compute the utility loss implied by the transition burden of the pension reform. Figure 
5-1 shows our results. Without positive efficiency effects, some generations would be net losers.   30
Figure 5-1 also shows the utility gains and losses for various increases in total factor productivity. 
Already a relatively small transient productivity effect of just 0.2 percentage points per year 
makes all generations better off. 
This is an important result. It must be appreciated together with the recent Economic Pol-
icy article by Boeri, Boersch-Supan and Tabellini (2001). They found that people in France, Ger-
many and Italy are well aware that population aging will put their pension systems into crisis. A 
majority also agrees to a fundamental pension reform in wishing to opt out the pay-as-you-
systems in favor of a mandatory partially funded system. Not too surprisingly, however, the peo-
ple did not like the idea of bearing a transition burden. This is where this paper fills in: even 
rather small gains in the efficiency of capital allocation in the wake of population aging and pen-
sion reform suffice to compensate for this transition burden, thereby fundamentally changing the 
political economy of pension reform.   31
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Table 1-1: The future of pay-as-you-go pension systems 
  1995 2010 2030 
France     
   Pension expenditures  (%GDP)  12.5  12.6  19.4 
   Equilibrium contribution rate
   (%wage bill)  24.3  24.4  37.7 
   Fiscal deficit
   (%wage bill)  0.5  0.6  100.5 
Germany     
   Pension expenditures  (%GDP)  10.0  11.0  18.4 
   Equilibrium contribution rate
   (%wage bill)  22.6  24.7  41.1 
   Fiscal deficit
   (%wage bill)  (1.1)
a 8.8 115.6 
Italy     
   Pension expenditures  (%GDP)  16.0  15.2  23.3 
   Equilibrium contribution rate
   (%wage bill)  42.6  40.4  61.9 
   Fiscal deficit
   (%wage bill)  0  29.9  186.8 
Notes: The equilibrium contribution rate is the percent of the wage bill required if the increase in pension expendi-
tures is financed by contributions only. The fiscal deficit is the percent of the wage bill arising if the increase in pen-
sion expenditures is financed by debt only. a) Surplus.  
Source: Chand and Jaeger (1996). 
   36
Table 1-2: Capital market features, 1996 
  Pay-as-you-go systems    Partially funded systems 
  France Germany  Italy   Netherlands  UK  US 
Share of stocks held by households  
and institutional investors  (%) 
a 
6.5 11.4 8.3    .  59.8  43.4 
Share of pension funds   
(% of household assets) 
b 
3 2 2    .  25  20 
Stock market capitalization   
(% of GDP) 
c 
26.3 22.9 21.4   96.5  87.0  55.1 
Size of pension funds   
(% of GDP) 
b 
5.6 3  4    92  77  62 
Size of pension funds 
(billion USD) 
b  
. 65  43    363 897  4,752 
Sources: a) OECD Financial Accounts; b) Bank for International Settlements (1998), Table V.5. c) World Bank, 
1998, Table 5.2; 
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Table 1-3: Capital performance relative to the United States 
 France  Germany  Italy 
   Aggregate return on investment 
a  71 70 58 
   Mean return on investment (firm sample) 
b    64 59 40 
   Median return on investment (firm sample) 
b  
78 82 51 
   Market sector capital productivity 
c 72  67  . 
   Total factor productivity 
d  82 81 84 
Note: All figures are expressed as percentage of the corresponding U.S. value. 
Sources: a) Mueller and Yurtoglu (1998), Table 2. b) ditto, Table 5. c) Börsch-Supan (1998b), Table 3. d) Computed 
from Hall and Jones (1996), Table 9. 
   38
Table 1-4: Composition of household wealth, Germany, 1978--1993 
1978 1983 1988 1993   
Savings  accounts  15.534 12.224 13.287 11.120 17.5% 
Building  societies  6.225 5.957 4.998 4.744 7.5% 
Stocks and bonds  7.430  8.957  10.381  19.948  31.4% 
Life insurance (cash value)  16.719  16.821  22.379  21.141  33.3% 
Other financial wealth  -  1.811  1.784  6.614  10.4% 
Gross financial wealth  45.909  45.770  52.830  63.567  100.0% 
./. consumer loans  23.043  28,859  30.266  35.055   
Net financial wealth  22.866  16.912  22.563  28.512   
Note: Household data from the Einkommens- and Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS). All figures in DM and in 1993 
prices.  
Source: Börsch-Supan et al. (1999). 
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Table 4-1: Granger-causality tests for GDP growth and stock market capitalization, 1988–97 
Right-hand side variable  Coefficient  t-statistic Observations  Total  R
2 
(SMC / GDP) as of period t–1   .0177  4.19  189  0.068 
(SMC / GDP) as of period t   .0155  3.95  211  0.064 
(SMC / GDP) as of period t+1   .0095  1.38  190  0.019 
Notes: Dependent variable is the annual rate of GDP growth as of period t. All regressions con-
tain country fixed effects. 
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Sources: France: Fall (2001); Germany: Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held, Rodepeter, Schnabel and Winter (2001);  
Italy: Brugiavini and Padula (2001); Netherlands: Alessie and Kapteyn (2001).   1
 

















































Notes: The horizontal axis displays stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP in 1997. The vertical axis 
displays the average annual growth rate of GDP over the period 1990-1998. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the OECD Development Report database.   2

















































Notes: The horizontal axis displays pension fund investment as a percentage of GDP in 1999 (for USA 1996). The 
vertical axis displays the average annual growth rate of GDP over the period 1990-1998. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the OECD Development Report database (GDP growth), Merrill 
Lynch (2001) and Bank for International Settlements (1998).    3











































Notes: he horizontal axis displays stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP. The vertical axis represents 
total factor productivity as percent of U.S. total factor productivity.  
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from the OECD Development Report database, and from Hall and 
Jones (1996).   4

















Source: Börsch-Supan (1998b). 
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Figure 5-1: Projected welfare effects of improved productivity growth rates on Germany 
Notes: This figure shows, by birth cohort, the changes in total discounted life-time utility induced by a fundamental 
pension reform for hypothetical transient improvements in the growth rate of total factor productivity.  
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on the dynamic general equilibrium model of pension reform by Börsch-Supan 












































] dg=0.0 percentage points
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dg=0.3 percentage points